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tion, their comparative analysis may be the starting point for the new comparative politics; (iii) The regional approach may solve the problem of overgeneralization in comparative politics by avoiding the dominant legalisticformalistic approach; (iv) The debate about presidentialism and parliamentarism has a direct relevance for the contemporary theory of democracy and dictatorship, if (a) the focus of the discussion is to be shifted from the formal to the substantive side of the old and new democracies and (b) the historical and structural role of parliamentarism during the democratic transition is put to the forefront. This is a policy paper for comparative politics while it cannot deal with all the above mentioned problems in detail, by being based on the generalizations of previous studies and hopes to be a useful introduction to the dialogue.
I. Comparative Communism Versus Comparative Politics
The process of rethinking democracy and dictatorship, at least in Central Europe, cannot start without a reassessment of comparative communism. Comparative politics and comparative communism are twin disciplines produced by the Cold War, one for friends, one for enemies. But with the revolutionary transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, all the preconditions of comparative communism have dramatically changed. Communism itself has almost completely disappeared, and if comparative communism as a discipline survives for a short period it is only to deal with its own history compared to the real history of the countries and regions concerned. A final scientific excursion to the necropolis of comparative communism would show both the historical relevance of the accumulated knowledge in area studies and the rapidly changing ideological functions of comparative communism during its history, leading now, after the end of the global confrontation, to an end of ideology.
The whole conceptual framework of comparative communism has presupposed some overgeneralizations: homogeneity, rigidity, and stability of the communist system. In this comparative trap of overgeneralizations, comparative communism has accepted the official ideology of the system to some extent, albeit from the reverse side, since the system has presented itself as all-embracing, homogeneous, stable and dynamic, and ruled by an exclusive Marxist ideology. This reversed image, in which the claimed positive features are turned to the opposite, is classically represented by the theory of totalitarianism, originating in the fight against Nazism and transferred immediately to the new enemy I 
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Attila Agh in the first days of the Cold War. Through this theory and ideology, comparative communism studies became a prisoner of cold war, although there has been a constant fight for independence against the concept of totalitarianism since it appeared for the first time, in an elaborated way, in the work of Friedrich and Brzezinski (I956), summarising the essence of all totalitarian systems in those well known six features. Lovenduski and Woodall (I987) correctly stated thirty years later that 'the totalitarian checklist suffers from an overstatement of its case, in particular from the inability to reflect change'.
Totalitarianism has meant also a preference for some bigger countries and was, in fact, a Soviet-centric approach, although for the experts 'a temptation to overdraw on their knowledge of particular systems leads often to unfounded generalizations about others'. Lovenduski and Woodall also point out in their comparative textbook on East European systems that these systems have been victims not only of a negative ethnocentrism, i.e. Soviet-centrism, but also of positive ones, being compared directly to Western systems so many times by direct transfers of Western concepts and features from pluralism to legitimation theory, without any specification of regional and national differences, that is, without any account being taken of the applicability of Western concepts in Central and Eastern Europe (Lovenduski and Woodall, I987: 7, I I ).
We can see the same assessment of totalitarianism from the introductory chapters of almost all textbooks of comparative communism. Stephen White co-authored at least two introductory pieces about the comparative study of communist political systems and in the later version he states: 'The totalitarian paradigm which was still dominant in the I950S came under increasing scrutiny as the i 960s advanced. By the I980S it was probably fair to say that no alternative orthodoxy had become dominant, rather a plurality of approaches had become accepted as legitimate', including regional and more general case studies (White and Nelson, I986, x). Not even the early stage of communism, such as classical Stalinism, had managed to reach the ideal of totalitarianism, with a real homogeneity of the whole socialist camp. In later history communist states have moved from a more concentrated power system to a more pluralistic one under internal pressure and resistance, and under the external pressure and demonstration effect of the Western democracies. Totalitarianism, as the reversed picture of ideal Stalinism, has remained the bogey or scarecrow of Western anticommunism.
White generalizes the history of comparative communism into two generations. The first generation literature was completely Sovietcentric and overpoliticized; relatively little attention was paid to the relationship between politics and society; finally this approach was more The most important achievement of the second generation literature, according to White, was the extension of the geographical boundaries. In my opinion, it was its grand failure, accepting world communism as a dynamic system. Its extension in space proved to be a crisis phenomenon of the core territories, i.e. compensation for the missing development of structural accommodation, resulting in the global crisis in the whole Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from the early 1970S onwards. Consequently, second generation literature that is 'more broadly based, empirically better founded and theoretically more sophisticated' appears to be a comparative trap, assuming positive prospects for communism in a stable bipolar world, so to say, objectively accepting not only the existence but also the dynamism of world communism, in its heterogeneity, yet not being able to realize its increasing erosion and the coming final crisis.
The prevailing idea of continuity and stability has evidently been based on the recurrence of small cycles in the history of state socialism in Central Europe. These short cycles, ten years or so, usually started with some liberalization efforts but after some time met the resistance of the hard core of the regime; therefore, they led to conservative reactions and then to rearrangements or conservative restorations. As recurring crisiscycles, these reform-cycles were the typical negative development pattern of state socialism in Central Europe, and provided a solid and reliable approach for comparative communism. The small cycle theory, had become a deeply embedded routine exercise of this discipline in the late I980s. At the same time it was a very comfortable standpoint, since if nothing new happened in Central and Eastern Europe, the well known crisis cycle repeats itself, so nothing new is to be prepared for. The final crisis of communism has thus become the cause of the final crisis of comparative communism itself.
Until the late I98os the small cycle theory explained major events in Central Europe. If the social tension deepened, it was easy to take this phenomenon for the start of a new small cycle as most of experts of comparative communism thought just before the collapse and not for the end of the longer cycle of world communism. The pattern of recurring crisis was so widely accepted that this idea precluded the discovery of the real nature of the coming fundamental changes, although the 'native' experts in the countries concerned warned about the coming final crisis long ago. In the West the 'more of the same' cyclical approach dominated. Its stubborn continuity led area experts and comparativists to predict not the future, but the past, i.e. the repetition of the small cycles as before. For example:
I base this prediction on the fact that the current critical situation in the alliance is not unprecedented, and that Eastern Europe has faced worse crises before. Each of the previous crises was followed by some institutional changes accompanied by appeals, promises and exhortations from Moscow, and once the dust had settled things returned back to the normal Schlamperei, so characteristic of Communist systems in the region . . . I see little difference between the situations in I988 and that twenty years ago, and hence I do not expect radical changes in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe, at least in the foreseeable future (Korbonski, I989: 22) . This text is, in fact, the obituary of comparative communism in its second generation. It is true that comparative communism, with all of its theoretical and ideological weaknesses, has accumulated a large treasury of knowledge. But now, in the process of the final crisis it is high time to leave it behind, even in its promising and more sophisticated variant, the third generation literature of the late I98os.
We have to realize that the more of the same approach was a very comfortable position for both politicians and political scientists. Therefore, during and after the I989 revolutions a big resistance was felt among some Western experts to accept the new realities and to start the tiresome business of re-interpreting everything. With growing unease the slogan 'West is West, and East is East' again appeared, and later as another extreme position, the 'no-nonsense' approach emerged, stating that everything will be changed beyond recognition overnight. But the most important danger for comparative politics and Central European area studies is that the theory and ideology of totalitarianism returned with a vengeance. This simplified concept triumphs nowadays in social science, journalism and official declaration, both in the West and East, precluding the correct analysis of the real transition and the perspectives of new democracies.
Transitions never fit into previously well arranged rules and concepts, such as the rigidly closed alliance-systems and totalitarian theories. In the nicely arranged and regulated world generalized in the form of comparative politics versus comparative communism, some 'commuThe Transition to Democracy in Central Europe 139 nist' countries like Hungary and Poland in the early I98os began to move to the barren land of the in between, and felt themselves to be in the middle of nowhere. This sphere of nowhere has recently been extended to all formerly socialist countries, mostly to those which still resist changes, to the unsplendidly isolated China and Albania, themselves showing the first signs of the final crisis as well.
The study of world Marxist governments in the i980s brought some meager results and missed the opportunity to grasp the real changes, because of the neglect of regional or even continental dissimilarities. This is why, in my opinion, the comparative revolution in this respect failed, since it was a doubtful exercise skating on the thin ice of global overgeneralizations about world communism (Agh, I990).
Comparative politics has had a series of revolutions and counterrevolutions (Mayer, I989). Now we can afford some optimism that these fundamental changes in Central Europe may lead to a real comparative revolution by abolishing the Cold War type separation of comparative politics and comparative communism. To bridge the gap between the two, first of all, intensive cooperation of Western and native area experts is needed. But before suggesting the slogan, 'comparativists go East!', we have to state that the present rigid juxtaposition of democracy and dictatorship, which is an artificial and mostly ideologically motivated contrast, has to be overcome by shifting the focus of our research to transitions. In the comparative study of democractic transitions from authoritarian systems, Central Europe is a relevant case. 
II. Two Global Waves of Democratization
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) contrasts the major features of the American and European approaches in much more detail: 'The United States has been the dominant power in the Western world and has taken over prime concern for the stability and the security of its alliance system'. As American power expanded round the world, Washington acquired direct interests in many areas where any attempt to promote genuine democracy would tend to prove quite destabilising. Consequently, American policy makers have learned to exercise great caution and discrimination in pursuing this objective, and have stretched the meaning of the term to embrace an extraordinary variety of friendly but repressive regimes. American political scientists have designed rationales to systematize this evolution (the emergence of the middle sectors was followed by crises of modernization, and most recently, the authoritarian/totalitarian dichotomy), but the more traditional view still retains its hold over significant sectors of American public opinion. The promotion of democracy as a foreign policy rhetoric may be seen from different angles but, Whitehead declares, as a result of the diverging foreign policy strategies in the recent period of the new transitions to democracy 'the between the fragile democracies of Latin America and the consolidated ones in Southern Europe. Thus, the regional approach in its cultural, historical and socio-political complexity also emerged during the second wave of democratizations. It offers a theoretical alternative in comparative politics to the formalistic typologies moving only on the surface of socio-political reality, separating the legal-constitutional and other features from the regional and national complexity, and comparing remote countries and continents, thus neglecting the regional similarities in the deeper structures of the societies concerned. After the Latin American and Southern European 'studies' in comparative politics, Central Europe has again raised the issue of the regional approach as a sine qua non of the correct explanation or theorising about the transition to democracy.
After the modest Bucharest repeat of the Tienaamen massacre one year earlier, American newspapers discovered a 'split in Eastern Europe', although there was nothing to discover. Or it may be something new just for the Americans, since Central Europe and Eastern Europe proper (or the Balkan region in this case) have ever been very different, so any split between them might have taken place much before the discovery of the Americans. But in the whole postwar period the Westerners usually have operated with the misnomer of Eastern Europe, meaning the Soviet bloc or the external empire of the Soviet Union as a military and political unit. This artificial creation of the Cold War appeared to be homogeneous with very small, similar and basically insignificant countries. In this Eastern Europe, evidently, it is just a waste of time to look for individual or regional differences. Although the official American foreign policy in this part of Europe allegedly was that of differentiation, it was not too much felt in theory or in practice.
No doubt there was a great effort by the Soviet Union to introduce political, social and economic homogeneity in their external empire, which was formulated in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine fixing the definition of socialism with its obligatory criteria for ideology and politics. This homogenization, however, was never able to reach the deep structures of societies and transform them. Westerners were too willing to accept the reinforced military and political unity for the allembracing reality. The half-a-century long cycle of Sovietization in the external empire left behind a lesson of history that armies can harm a lot but they cannot liquidate centuries-old differences in state, economy and civil society between and within regions. The contrast is now bigger than ever between Central Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the North-Western part of Yugoslavia) and Eastern Europe proper (Roumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the South-Eastern part of Yugoslavia), and opens the possibility of an extending zone of emerging independent states in the Western part of the Soviet Union.
There have been a lot of debates about the coherence of Central and Eastern Europe and there will still be many, as has also been the case with Southern Europe. The question remains whether they are separate regions indeed, and if it is so, what are their major distinguishing features? The answer is not simple; still the regional approach seems to be more fruitful than a legal formalism that neglects the common regional features. I accept, on my side, that these regional similarities and common features, rooted in history and expressed in the relative same level of development, cannot and should not be overstretched. Thus, the study of democratic transitions offers itself as a test case for the reginal approach and vice versa. The regional approach, if it proves to be fruitful, may also be applied in other fields of comparative politics. Latin America, as such is too big and heterogeneous for a region, so it is considered here only as a general background of the analysis. The Latin American regional approach can be exemplified here by some major states ( Following the general models of Transitions, I have tried to extend it to Central Europe, using as the two major indicators the international system and the internal development patterns. I think that differences between the American and European approaches to the promotion of democracy abroad are largely responsible, indeed, for the divergence of democratizations between Latin America, with democracies fragile and unconsolidated, and Southern Europe, with an almost completely finished economic and political consolidation process. Thus, it is mostly from longue duree historical trends and the present international factors that the asymmetrical relations between major Latin American countries and the United States, and the symmetrical ones between the Mediterranean region and the Brussels-based European Community, have produced different transitions in the first two stages of their democratizations. It is not by chance, but because of this factor, that we have in Latin America a development pattern of recurring crisis, i.e. the constant historical move from dictatorship to democracy, and from democracy to dictatorship. In southern Europe, there is an evolutionary development from the mid-seventies after the long cycle of the authoritarian rule. An evolutionary and gradualist development started, progressing towards democratization by pacts in a peaceful way (ruptura or reforma pactada).
The same model with two major indicators gives a point of departure also for the analysis of Central Europe, which shows, in my opinion, a composite picture of both Latin America and Southern Europe. There was in Central Europe a long cycle of dictatorship for half a century, it is a general frame of reference of all historical and political analyses, and very similar to Southern Europe. Within this long cycle, however, we have a series of small cycles of reforms and conservative rearrangements, which makes Central Europe similar to the Latin American development pattern of recurring cycles with a constant move from liberal to conservative periods and vice versa. This development pattern in 146 Attila Aggh Central Europe, again, was determined by the special international setup, but this time much more closely and directly than in the other two cases, because of the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and the imperial nature of dependence. The whole internal structure and domestic development, from the security dimensions to cultural fields, was determined very strictly from outside by the external empire, and the reform cycles could move only within this framework, touching the 'walls' each time. The reform movements, even though very cautious, had really hit the 'walls' (1956, I968, I98I ) because the reform process had its inner dynamism and once started, it was almost impossible to stop it, even for those who initiated and led it. Due to its internal contradiction, the term 'reform' has turned out to be a misnomer, meaning originally the correction of the system but after having realized that this was impossible it has come to be used as a term for systematic change. The major conclusion of the reform politicians of Central Europe, at least in Hungary after I956, I968-7I and I985-89 was that state socialism as a system cannot be reformed, it should be abolished.
After Latin America and Southern Europe, we can take Central Europe as the third stage of the second global wave of democratic transitions; Eastern Europe may be the fourth one. Latin America still has no consolidated democracies, Southern Europe has its success story in democratization, but the fate of Central Europe is still undecided; it can go either way. The i 990S will be a decade of chaos and uncertainty for Central Europe, and the future for Eastern Europe is much more problematic for a longer period. The decisive issue is whether Central Europe could become a part of the European integration process with its binding contracts, i.e. with growing intensive ties and substantial assistance by the advanced states to overcome the present economic crisis in a form like Marshall aid, using this term conditionally to indicate a parallel process of what is going on currently in East Germany. Can the three Central European countries become involved in European integration with its standards and safeguards in economic development and political democratization?
The first issue for the new democracies is how to promote equitable economic development which is at the same time democratically responsible, i.e. how to contain social unrest which could jeopardize democracy if it is identified with disorder and decreasing living standards. This decisive issue of the stabilization of new democracies is formulated by President Vaclav Havel in his statement; 'We have done away with the totalitarian system but we have yet to win democracy'. The Central European transition has had so far an evolutionary development pattern, it has been rather peaceful, moving by pacts, but the real similarity with Southern Europe can be only in transition, after the initial crisis political framework for efficient conflict regulation (see Przeworski in O'Donnell et al., vol. I, I986: 56). The establishment of an efficient mechanism of conflict regulation and crisis management based on a large national consensus and participatory rights is on the agenda of current history in Central Europe.
In the democratic transition of Central Europe a formalistic or procedural model of democracy would not work properly, even functionally, and it would certainly alienate people from politics, which is an acute danger. The peaceful revolution or transition has been a limited participation model, the population is tired, it has been exhausted by overwork and an increasing economic burden. Any legal formalism without meaningful participation would turn people against politics, even with competitive parties and rival ideologies. The peoples of our countries need a clear commitment of the new democratic state to all citizens to make them able, by providing them with all the necessary social and economic preconditions, to exercise fully their democratic political rights. To avoid the separation of politics and people, participation is now much more important than in the consolidated democracies. Without a clear identification with the process of transition by doing it themselves, the unsatisfied masses can sweep away the whole politics, old and new, by outbursts of lawlessness, strikes and mass manifestations.
We are at a turning point. As it was written on the walls of Prague in November I989: 'Who, if not we? When, if not now!'
